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Lide: Some Uniques in South Carolina Law

THE SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW QUARTERLY
REVIEW SECTION
SOME "UNIQUES" IN SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
JUDGE LANNEAU D. LIDE*

It has occurred to me that it might be of interest to give
consideration to some phases of our South Carolina law, both
adjective and substantive, which may be deemed more or
less distinctive of this jurisdiction-hence the title, "Some
'Uniques' of South Carolina Law." In the main the basic and
general principles of law are fairly uniform throughout the
United States, though in each state there are some concepts
that are slight variations from the general rule, and in each
state there are some concepts that may be termed unique.
No OPENING STATEMENT

The first matter for consideration is that we have no opening statement, although the usual practice in other jurisdictions, in civil cases tried by jury, is to precede the introduction of any evidence by an opening statement, that is to say,
a statement by counsel for the respective parties, giving briefly
the nature of the action, substance of the pleadings, and the
points in issue, as well as the substance of the evidence proposed to be introduced. The obvious reason for such a practice
is that the jury may have some advance notice of what the
case is about, before the evidence is offered. The time-honored
practice here, however, is to open the case merely by the reading of the pleadings; and when I first came to the bar this
was usually done in a mechanical way, and must have meant
very little to the jury. However, in more recent times counsel
do occasionally interpose a word of explanation here and
there.
*Judge of Circuit Court, Retired. Member of South Carolina Bar, Marion, S. C.
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While I see no occasion for modifying our practice to the
extent of introducing the opening statement, because this is
just another matter about which counsel frequently disagree,
that is, as to how far the statement should be allowed to go, I
do think that the Court should permit counsel in the reading
of the pleadings to translate them into readily intelligible
language, and add such words of explanation as are necessary
for the understanding of the issues to be tried; and I believe
the Judges would be favorable to allowing this to be done,
without the adoption of any formal rule on the subject.
Perhaps, however, there is a better method of giving the
jury some information about the nature of the case they are
about to try, and that would be for the Presiding Judge himself to make a statement, after the pleadings are read, as to
the issues for trial. Indeed, I recall before I came to the bar,
but while I was a Deputy Clerk of Court at Marion, that Judge
Benet was accustomed to make a statement of this character.
While as Trial Judge I tried some cases, such as condemnation
cases, which I thought required some opening explanation,
which was given by me; in general, I did not make such an
opening statement as Judge Benet did; one reason for this
being that under our very loose system of filing the pleadings,
they are frequently not available to the Presiding Judge until
the trial actually begins. In other words, in order to make a
proper opening statement he should have the pleadings somewhat in advance of the trial.
No

NOTATION OF EXCEPTIONS

There is a phase of South Carolina practice which has grown
up, so to speak, during my own recollection, to which attention
may be directed, and that is, generally speaking, it is not necessary for exceptions to be noted in the course of the trial, as
the foundation of an appeal. Consequently, nowadays the word
"exceptions" as used by us really means "assignments of error" in the transcript of record for appeal.
As I recall, in my early days at the bar, where an objection
was made to the admission of testimony, and the Court overruled the objection, it was considered necessary for counsel to
go fuither and request the Court to note an exception. That
practice, as to the admission of testimony and other matters
arising during the trial, however, has certainly been practically abandoned, and I think wisely so. Not only is time
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thereby saved, but a note of irritationis avoided. It is of course
quite necessary that the objection made or point raised be
clearly stated and that the ruling of the Court be definite; but
if so, the exception follows as a matter of course, and no notation is required.
REVIEW SECTION

But a much more important phase of the matter now under
discussion relates to the charge to the jury. The well known
practice, in the Federal Courts, and in some other jurisdictions, requiring counsel -to object or except to the charge before the final retirement of the jury, of course does not prevail in the South Carolina State Courts, although theoretically
such a practice might tend to promote the ultimate correctness
of the Judge's instructions to the jury. On the other hand, it
places a rather "delicate and difficult task" upon counsel in
many cases, and I believe our practice is preferable. But it
should be borne in mind that counsel cannot escape all responsibility. The rule is well recognized that if the Presiding Judge
makes an error in the statement of issues, such a mistake must
be brought to his attention by counsel, so that it may be corrected. Furthermore, the duty of the Trial Judge is to charge
the general principles of law applicable to the facts of the
case, and if more detailed instructions are desired counsel must
make timely request for the same. But if the Judge gives an
erroneous instruction as to the law in his charge, it is not
necessary for counsel to object to the same or to bring the
matter to his attention. Coleman v. Laurey, 199 S. C. 442, 20
S. E. (2d) 65 (1942).
Our practice in this respect does not meet with unanimous
approval, because it is argued that counsel should rather seek
to promote the correctness of the charge. On the other hand,
as our Court holds: "To make such equirement might place
counsel in an embarrassing position." Steinberg v. South Carolina Power Co., 165 S. C. 367, 163 S. E. 881, 883 (1932).

No CHARGE ON THE FACTS
We now come to a principle of South Carolina law of very
great importance, the same being embodied in our Constitution of 1895; Article V, Section 26, reading as follows: "Judges
shall not charge juries in respect to matters of fact, but shall
declare the law." This section was substituted for Section 26,
Article IV, of the Constitution of 1868, which reads as fol-
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lows: "Judges shall not charge juries in respect to matters of
fact, but may state the testimony and declare the law."
The practice in the Federal Courts permitting, indeed requiring, the Trial Judge to summarize the testimony, and allowing him also to express his opinion on the facts, conforms
in general to the common law practice as it once prevailed in
this State. But in the course of time the States generally became considerably agitated on the subject, and many changes
were made; the tendency being to limit the power of the Trial
Judge and consequently to enlarge the power of the jury. The
result has been that there is a wide variance among the States;
and it will be observed that there is a distinct variation between the 1868 constitutional provision and the 1895 constitutional provision. Stating the matter another way: The Federal
practice may be designated as being to the extreme right and
our present South Carolina practice to the extreme left.
The Constitution of 1868 itself made a radical change in the
law, because prior to that time the Circuit Judge had the right
to advise the jury on the facts, and there were a good many
decisions upon this constitutional provision; but the Constitution of 1895 went much further, and the clause on its face
laid down a very hard rule for the Judges to follow, for the
declaration of the law in the abstract is difficult to be done,
and difficult to be understood, especially by those not trained
in legal matters. However, this section of the Constitution has
been liberally 'construed by our Supreme Court, beginning
with the noted case of Norris v. Clinkscales, 47 S. C. 488, 25
S. E. 797 (1896), in which the opinion was delivered by Judge
Benet, Acting Associate Justice, and wherein the rationale
of the constitutional provision is luminously stated, including
its abrogation of a significant part of the 1868 constitutional
provision; and from these decisions it will be seen that the
real object is to leave the determination of questions of fact
to the jury exclusively, uninfluenced by any expressions of
opinion by the Judge, and to this end, he must not even state
the testimony. And I may say, from my experience on the
bench, that in the exercise of due care the Presiding Judge
may, with the aid of the pleadings and the use of hypothetical
statements of fact, explain the law to the jury so that it may
be understood, provided the abstract formulas of the law are
translated into the language of every day life. And in this
connection it may be observed that in recent years there have
been few reversals based upon an alleged charge on the facts.
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REVIEW SECTION

-Of course, lawyers and judges are quite conservative, and having adjusted themselves to one system would rather not see
it changed. My own view is that while the constitutional provision might appear to be unduly drastic, it has worked out
-very well in practice.
THE SCINTILLA RULE
As somewhat akin to the inhibition against a charge upon
-the facts, is the scintilla rule, which I well remember as one
of the significant features of practice, particularly in negligence cases; and it was formerly regarded as meaning just
what the words imply, to wit, that a mere spark of evidence
required the submission of the case to the jury. But in the
course of time, it seems to me, there has been a gradual lib-eralizing of the principle, as indicated by the more recent decisions, the existing rule being "that when only one reasonable
inference, not just one inference, but one reasonable inference,
can be deduced from the evidence, it becomes a question of
law for the court, and not a question of fact for the jury".
Plowden v. Wilson, 186 S. C. 285, 195 S. E. 847 (1938). And
it has been held that the scintilla of evidence must be real, material, pertinent and relevant, not speculative or theoretical
,deductions. Johnson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 206 S. C.
415, 34 S. E. (2d) 757 (1945).
But one of the most clarifying decisions of our Supreme
Court relating to this matter arises out of the well established
-doctrine, that in a suit brought under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, the rule prevailing in the Federal Court is applicable upon a State Court trial, to wit, that there must be
more than a scintilla before the case may be properly left
to the discretion of the trier of facts, but that if only one
reasonable inference can be drawn from the evidence, the
question is one of law for the Court. The case I refer to is
that of Jester v. Southern Railway Co., 204 S. C. 395, 29 . E.
(2d) 768 (1944), in which the unanimous opinion of our Supreme Court was delivered by Chief Justice Baker, wherein
the Court after stating the Federal rule held that the same
"is in line with the rule of law prevailing in this State governing the granting of nonsuits and direction of verdicts, although theoretically this Court adheres to the scintilla rule".
(Emphasis added.) In other words, if I may interpret the decision, the rule of reason as applied in both the Federal Court
and the State Court is substantially the same. Hence the scin-
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tilla rule can scarcely now be regarded as a part of our law,
except in a modified sense.
APPORTIONMENT OF ACTUAL DAMAGES

We come now to something which may be considered really
unique, and that is the South Carolina rule that where joint
tortfeasors are sued, the jury may sever the actual damages
and apportion them; a rule which scarcely seems logical in
view of the general principle that the injured party may sue
one or more of the joint tortfeasors for his entire damages;
and moreover, there is no contribution between joint tortfeasors. However, the rule is firmly established in this State,
as will appear by reference to one of the earliest cases contained in our reports, to wit, that of White v. M'Neily, I Bay
11 (1784), where it was held that a jury may sever damages
and apportion them according to the degree and nature of
the offense committed by each offender, that is, by each of
the joint tortfeasors. And there is a note to the report of this
case to the effect that it may be considered as a part of the
common law of South Carolina.
The whole matter was discussed and considered in the case
of Jenkins v. Southern Railway Co., et at., 130 S. C. 180, 125
S. E. 912 (1924), in which the leading -opinion was delivered
by Mr. Justice Cothran. And reference was made by him to
the White v. M'Neily case, supra, and it was held that the rule
therein laid down had been too firmly adhered to for it to be
abandoned, notwithstanding its departure from the rule of the
common law. I quote the following from the opinion by Mr.
Justice Cothran:
"In view, however, of the almost solitary position of
this Court upon the question, opposed as it is by the authority of the supreme tribunal of the nation, and by almost every other State Court (and citicized as it has been
by the judges who felt imposed .to follow it), the rule
should be confined to the precise condition which gave
it birth."
The Jenkins case then before the Court was against a master
and a servant for slander, the liability of the master being
wholly dependent upon the liability of the servant. Consequently, it was held that in a case of that character there could
be no apportionment, and the railroad could not be held liable
for more than its agent.
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And in the later case of Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., et al., 142 S. C. 125, 140 S. E. 443 (1927), which was
also a master and servant case, the Court held that while the
rule laid down in the Jenkins case as to actual damages was
correct, punitive damages should be apportioned as between
a master and a servant, and inferentially as to joint tortfeasors in general, because of, inter alia, the difference in the
financial condition of defendants.
I do not now recall trying a case on the bench where actual
damages were apportioned, but I did try one at the bar which
went to the Supreme Court on other grounds, but no point
was made as to the apportionment, in which there were two
defendants, only one, however, being represented by me, and
the jury divided the large amount of the verdict equally between them. Miller, Admr., v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Co., et al., 140 S. C. 123, 138 S. E. 675 (1926).
CONTRIBUTORY WILFULNESS

Our Supreme Court was certainly a pioneer in the promulgation of the doctrine of contributory wilfulness, although
there had been in a few other States decisions leaning in that
direction. Mr. Justice Fraser in the case of Spillers v. Griffin,
109 S. C. 78, 95 S. E. 133 (1918), where the doctrine of contributory wilfulness was first declared in this State, says,
speaking for the Court:
"The Courts, however, are not bound to find legislative
authority or the authority of the other cases stating the
same facts before they can declare the law in a new aggregation of facts. Law is a science, and it is the duty of
the Courts to apply well recognized principles of law to
new conditions."
"Again, contributory negligence is not a defense to wilfulness, because the parties are not equally to blame. Apply that same rule here, and we find that when a plaintiff
wilfully contributes, as the approximate cause to his own
injury, he cannot recover, even though the defendant was
wilful. If the parties were equally, in the same class, to
blame in producing the injury, neither can recover. It was
error not to so charge."
The opinion in this case, while brief and citing no authority,
announces the principle of contributory wilfulness 'in the

Published by Scholar Commons, 1949

7

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 3 [1949], Art. 1

language I have quoted; and I recall very distinctly that this
case was a great surprise to the members of the bar, because
it gave to defendants in negligence suits a new defense. At
first the defense of contributory wilfulness was set up separately from that of contributory negligence, but more recently it is customary for them to be combined. It will be of interest to refer to the annotation to the report of the Spillers
case in L. R. A. 1918D 1193, for the annotator says that this
case seems to be sound in principle and is supported by the
few cases touching the question involved, with the exception
of Alabama cases.
It may be mentioned in passing that Mr. Justice Fraser
stated in the Spillers case that the doctrine of the "last clear
chance" is not the law in this State; but from a reading of the
excellent article by A. L. Hardee, Esq., of the Florence Bar,
on this subject,' it will appear that the more recent decisions
the last clear chance doctrine,
of our Supreme Court approve
2
at least in a modified form.
There is yet another subject of some importance in the cone
sideration of distinctive South Carolina doctrines, and that is
the award of punitive damages for the fraudulent beach of a
contract; but I do not have space for its proper consideration.
However, the subject was excellently treated in the December,
1948, issue of the South Carolina Law Quarterly.3 While the
doctrine has been more frequently applied to insurance cases,
its origin was far different, as will appear by reference to
the primary case of Welborn v. Dixon, 70 S. C. 108, 49 S. E.
232 (1904). Let me say this simply-that while I think moderation is essential in the award of punitive damages, a breach
of contract accomplished with a fraudulent intention and accompanied by a fraudulent act reasonably justifies moderate
punishment; and that the doctrine as applied by our Courts
has in general been beneficial.
STATUTE DE

DONIs NOT ADOPTED

The next proposition is indeed rather unique, and relates to
an entirely different field of the law from that heretofore dis
1. The Status of the "Last Clear Chance" Doctrine in the State of
South Carolina, 1 S.C.L.Q. 70 (1948).
2. cf Scott v. Greenville Pharmacy, Inc., 212 S. C. 485, 48 S. E. (2d)
324 (1948).

(Treated as a Case Note, p. 293, post.-Ed.)

3. The Awarding of Punitive Damages for Bre'ach of Insurance Contracts in South Carolina, 1 S.C.L.Q. 150 (1948).
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cussed, to wit, the fact that the Statute de Donis, relating to
real estate, never became a part of the common law of this
State, this result being peculiar to South Carolina, Iowa, Nebraska and Oregon. I recall quite definitely that in the study
of the law prior to my admission to the bar I was very much
surprised to find this to be true, because some of the textbooks
made no reference to the failure of South Carolina to recognize
the ancient statute passed in 1285 in the reign of Edward I.
By this statute fees conditionalwhich were limited to the heirs
of one's body were made inalienable under any circumstances,
and were therefore called estates tail, which, instead of descent to heirs generally, go to the heirs of the donee's body
in a direct line, so long as his posterity endures. And in a
quite recent case, to wit, that of Cresswell v. Batnk of Greenwood, et al., 210 S. C. 47, 41 S. E. (2d) 393 (1947), the Court
(opinion by Stukes, J.) calls attention to the fact that the
word "entail" is meaningless in South Carolina, because we do
not recognize the Statute de Donis.
The result is of course that the fee conditional at common
law continues to exist in South Carolina, to wit, that an
estate limited to the heirs of the body of the grantee, or the
issue of his body, becomes alienable upon the birth to the
grantee of a child, no matter how brief its life might be, that
is to say, alienable by deed, although not devisable, because
a devise is effective only after the death of the testator. It
is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive that a grantor would
deliberately intend such a result. But this technical rule of
the law prevails as a part of a logical although artificial system. It is of course of importance to observe, however, that
the fee conditional estate may perhaps become relatively obsolete, because it often results from the application of the Rule
in Shelley's Case, that is to say, wlere an estate is granted to
one for life and after his death to the heirs or issue of his
body; and the Rule in Shelley's Case has been abolished by
statute as to deeds or wills executed October 1, 1924, and
thereafter. See Section 8802, Code 1942.
TRIAL OF EQUITABLE ISSUES

There are other phases of our South Carolina law which
might more aptly be considered as covered by my subject than
some of those I have mentioned, but space will not permit me
to refer to any other, save the trial of equitable causes and
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equitable issues in law cases under our practice. And admittedly our practice in this respect could not be considered a
peculiarity of the South Carolina law. However, it is characteristic of our system and is not followed in some jurisdictions. I refer to our practice of trying equity cases by the
Court without a jury; and I may say that in my opinion there
is no State where the distinction between law and equity is
more carefully recognized and observed than in South Carolina, although of course under the Code, and guaranteed by
our Constitution, we have but one form of action and enjoy
all the benefits of Code procedure; which I think is a highly
desirable result.
Section 593, Code 1942, provides that an issue of fact in
actions for the recovery of money only or specific real or
personal property must be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial
be waived; that is to say, actions at law must be tried by a
jury.
It is indeed provided in this section that in equity causes,
upon a timely motion, the Presiding Judge may, in his discretion, cause to be framed an issue or issues of fact to be tried
by a jury; and that the findings of fadt upon such issues by
the jury shall be conclusive of the same, just as in law cases.
This provision of the statute might be considered as a definite change in the equity practice, but it will be observed that
the granting of such a motion is in the discretion of the Presiding Judge; and moreover, the Court has held that this statute
does not abrogate the rule that the Judge sitting as a Chancellor may submit issues of fact to the jury solely for the enlightenment of his conscience. And it may further be observed,
as will appear by reference to the case of Momeier v. John
McAlister, Inc., et al., 190 S. C. 529, 3 S. E. (2d) 606 (1939),
that the Supreme Court has held that even where issues had
been framed for a jury trial under the statute, the Presiding
Judge had the right to withdraw the case from the jury before
the.findings were made, and decide the issues for himself, or
have the jury make findings on the issues solely for his enlightenment in determining the judgment to be rendered. In
other words, the whole matter is left in the discretion of the
Trial Judge.
I believe the wisdom of the practice thus established by
the Court has the approval of the bar, for during my entire
experience on the bench .a motion to frame issues under the
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statute has been very rare indeed, and I do not now recall trying a single equity case with the aid of a jury.
I am strongly of opinion, based on my experience at the bar
and on the bench, as I said in a brief editorial published in the
American Bar Association Journal, June, 1948, "that in general the jury performs its functions well and in furtherance
of justice, in those cases which are appropriate to that method
of trial, that is to say, in (law) cases involving issues not unduly complex, and where there is careful instruction on the
law by the Judge". On the other hand, however, there are few
equity cases in which, in my judgment, issues should be submitted to the jury; and if issues are submitted, I think in
most cases they should not be submitted under the statute but
under the time-honored rule, for the enlightenment of the
Chancellor.
I had the honor to be the secretary of Judge Woods upon
his elevation to the South Carolina Supreme Court, and I am
sure that he is regarded as one of its most celebrated members throughout its entire history. He was a profound student of the law, believing, however, that it might be improved
in many ways. I have often heard him say in effect that the
high praise speakers and writers give to the common law of
England seems rather peculiar in view of the fact that the
system of equity had to be devised to relieve the law of some
of its defects and injustices. At all events, equity, even in the
technical meaning of that word, has been a great liberalizing
agency, because it arises out of the consideration of "whatsoever things are just". And in its larger sense it is, and should
be, the heart of our judicial system.
I had the .pleasure of hearing Lord Hugh Pattison Macmillan's address at the meeting of tl~e American Bar Association at Cleveland in 1938, in which he spoke of his service
on the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the court of
appeal for the British Empire, with a wider territorial jurisdiction than any court of any country in the world. He stated
that of course in passing upon appeals from the colonies and
dominions and other parts of the Empire, including mandated territories, it was their duty to administer the law in
conformity with the local system, but that in some cases there
was no local system or at least no local law applicable. However, they were instructed by their letters patent "to do what
is just and equitable in such cases". And I quote the following
from Lord Macmillan's interesting address:
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"So in many cases which come before us, where we have
liberty to administer an equitable jurisdiction, what has
struck me so much is this-and this is the text to which
I alluded-the essential unity of the principles of justice.
through the ages.
"Studying, as one has to, all these manifold and various
systems, they are seen to differ enormously in their procedure. They differ in their approach to their questions.
But when one comes at the end of the day to do, as we
are bouid to do, justice, isn't it striking, gentlemen (and
you from your experience I am sure will bear me out) how
simple and how fundamental are those real essential principles of justice?"
Mr. Justice Holmes, one of America's truly great jurists,
took a highly pragmatic view of the law, holding that it is
merely the process of predicting what the judgment of the
Court upon a given state of facts will be; but we cannot escape the conviction that there are certain fundamentals of
right and justice, "the same yesterday, today and forever".
Hence, the final test of our practice is not whether it be unique
or not, but whether it conforms, as Lord Macmillan says, to
"what is just and good and fair, and somehow or other a man
of good will knows what is just and good and fair".
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